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Abstract
Anxiety has wide reaching and complex effects on cognitive performance. Although it can intrude 
on cognition and interfere with performance, it can also facilitate information processing and 
behavioral responses. In a previous study, we showed that anxiety induced by threat of shock 
facilitates performance on the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), a vigilance test, 
which probes response inhibition to infrequent no-go stimuli. The present study sought to identify 
factors that may have contributed to such improved performance, including on- and off-task 
thinking (assessed with thought probes) and individual differences in attention control, as 
measured with the Attention Control Scale (Derryberry and Reed, 2002). Replicating our prior 
finding, we showed that shock threat significantly reduced errors of commission on the nogo 
trials. However, we extended this finding in demonstrating that this effect was driven by subjects 
with low attention control. We therefore confirm that anxiety increases inhibitory control of 
prepotent responses – a mechanism which is adaptive under threat – and show that this effect is 
greater in those who rely more upon such prepotent responding, i.e., those with low attentional 
control.
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Introduction
Anxiety is a state of distress, tension, and vigilance in response to threat. Anxiety is 
adaptive, it prepares organisms for action (Langner and Eickhoff, 2013), increases arousal, 
and facilitates bottom-up sensory processing (Cornwell et al., 2007, Pessoa, 2009), but it can 
also disrupt top-down cognitive control caused by interference from internal and external 
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task-irrelevant stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007, Eysenck et al., 2007, Forster et al., 2013). 
Research on the cognitive effects of anxiety has mostly focused on cognitive disruption by 
discrete external threats (e.g., attentional/affective bias) (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), but little is 
known about the effect of anxiety on sustained attention tasks, when attention needs to be 
maintained over time (Forster et al., 2013, Righi et al., 2009). On the one hand, vigilance 
tasks would seem to be especially vulnerable to lapses of attention, including disruption by 
anxious cognition (Forster et al., 2013, Horowitz and Becker, 1971, Smallwood et al., 2009, 
Su et al., 2009, Vinski and Watter, 2013). On the other hand, vigilance tasks could benefit 
from the arousing and and energizing properties of anxiety (Easterbrook, 1959, Lang et al., 
1992, Langner and Eickhoff, 2013).
In a previous study, we reported that anxiety induced by threat of shock improved 
performance on a vigilance task, the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) 
(Robinson et al., 2013a). The present study sought to extend these findings by examining the 
potential role that attentional lapses and individual differences in attention control may play 
in such anxiety-related improved performance.
During SART, subjects respond to high-frequency go trials and inhibit responses to rare 
nogo trials. Because of the tedious nature of SART, subjects progressively withdraw their 
attention, which promotes attentional lapses and ‘mind wandering’ (also called task-
unrelated thoughts, TUTs) (Robertson et al., 1997, Smallwood et al., 2004), leading to nogo 
commission errors (i.e., failure to inhibit response to nogo trials) (McVay and Kane, 2012b, 
Robertson et al., 1997). Studies have found inconsistent effects of anxiety on SART so far. 
While we reported that anxiety induced by shock threat improved nogo accuracy (i.e., 
improved inhibition of the prepotent go response) (Robinson et al., 2013a), a finding we are 
replicating in several ongoing studies, including a study in patients with anxiety disorders, a 
recent study showed an association between trait anxiety and slower go RT in periods 
without nogo errors (Forster et al., 2013). This latter finding is consistent with cognitive 
theories of anxiety, according to which anxiety-induced performance deficits are caused by 
worry and self-preoccupation, which take up limited processing resources necessary to 
perform the task (Eysenck et al., 2007) or by poor attention control (Bishop, 2009). 
However, another study reported no effect of state or trait anxiety on reaction time (RT) or 
accuracy during SART (Righi et al., 2009). A key difference between our study and these 
studies is that we examined the effect of changes in state anxiety via an experimental threat 
manipulation, whereas the two other studies examined individual differences in trait anxiety. 
Hence, in the absence of an experimental manipulation to increase state anxiety, state 
anxiety may have been too low to detect an effect in (Righi et al., 2009), and the 
performance impairment associated with trait anxiety may reflect individual differences of 
personality characteristics in (Forster et al., 2013). Furthermore, while high trait anxiety 
may be associated with poor attention control (Forster et al., 2013), an increase in state 
anxiety may, depending of the task, be associated with better attention control (Robinson et 
al., 2013b), as suggested by our previous findings (Robinson et al., 2013a). In fact, the 
ability to increase response inhibition during an anxious state may be adaptive (Birk et al., 
2011). It is also consistent with theoretical models linking anxiety to activation of the 
behavioral inhibition system (Gray, 1987, Quay, 1997, Wright et al., 2014).
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In our initial study, we expected that anxiety induced by shock threat would impair 
performance (Robinson et al., 2013a). This was based on two assumptions. First, because 
SART promotes TUTs (Robertson et al., 1997) and TUTs are increased by personal 
concerns, worries, stress, and negative mood (Horowitz and Becker, 1971, Klinger, 1971, 
McVay and Kane, 2010, Su et al., 2009), we assumed that threat would promote anxious 
mentation and increase overall TUTs. Second, this increase in anxious TUTs would take up 
limited resources dedicated to the task, hence impairing performance (Eysenck et al., 2007). 
The fact that shock anticipation did not impair SART performance suggests that shock threat 
did not increase TUTs. In other words, TUTS may not have affected the influence of state 
anxiety on performance. One objective of this study was therefore to probe subjects’ 
thoughts while performing the task to examine the effect of shock threat on TUTs. Using 
real-time probe sampling (Gruberger et al., 2011, Teasdale et al., 1995), we assessed three 
types of thoughts, task-relevant thoughts (TRTs) and two types of TUTs, threat-related 
TUTs (threatTUTs) and non threat-related TUTs (nonthreatTUTs) (see Methods). Based on 
our previous findings that performance was not impaired by induced anxiety (Robinson et 
al., 2013a), contrary to some theories (McVay and Kane, 2010), we did not expect that 
TUTs would be affected by shock anticipation. Rather, we expected increased threatTUTs 
(and decreased nonthreatTUTs) during shock anticipation compared to safe periods.
One mechanism by which shock threat could improve SART performance is via increased 
arousal or motivation (Chiles, 1958, Spence et al., 1956), which could then enhance the 
ability to cope with vigilance tasks (Singh et al., 1979), or via activation of the behavioral 
inhibition system (Gray, 1987, Quay, 1997, Wright et al., 2014). Poor performance during 
SART is more likely to be found in individuals with a weakened ability to inhibit prepotent 
responses or to cope with the monotonous nature of the task, resulting in impaired goal 
maintenance or sustained attention (Helton et al., 2009, McVay and Kane, 2012a, Robertson 
et al., 1997). Such characteristics are linked to attention control, the executive ability to 
direct attention (Judah et al., 2013). Accordingly, individuals most likely to benefit from 
shock threat are those with a weakened ability to cope with the monotonous nature of 
vigilance tasks, i.e., individuals with poor attention control (McVay and Kane, 2012a, 
Robertson et al., 1997). One possibility, therefore, is that individuals with low attention 
control are those who contribute to the improved performance during shock threat. Indeed, 
because they should show poor SART performance under safe condition, they should be 
more likely to benefit from threat-related increased arousal or motivation or activation of the 
behavioral inhibition system. By contrast, individuals with high attention control are 
unlikely to benefit from shock threat because they should show high and stable performance 
independently of the testing context. This hypothesis is consistent with results of a recent 
study that showed that shock threat improved cognitive performance during a continuous 
performance task and a working memory task only in subjects with low attention control 
(Hansen et al., 2009). Based on these findings, we expected lower attention control subjects 
to show lower performance in the absence of threat but that their performance would 
improve during shock threat. Attention control was measured using the Attentional Control 
Scale (ACS) (Derryberry and Reed, 2002, Rothbart and Derryberry, 1981), a well-
established questionnaire that assesses self-regulatory control associated with goal 
maintenance, attention shifting, effortful attention, and resistance to prepotent responses 
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(Derryberry and Rothbart, 1997, Evans and Rothbart, 2007), such as nogo responses 
(Herrmann et al., 2003, Wiersema and Roeyers, 2009).
To summarize, this study examined the impact of shock threat on TUTs and assessed 
whether individual differences in attention control contributed to the influence of state 
anxiety on SART performance. Analyses focused on nogo commission errors (i.e., failure to 
inhibit prepotent responses), as omission errors to go trials were minimally affected by 
shock threat in our previous study (Robinson et al., 2013a).
Material and Method
Participants
Sixty healthy volunteers (31 female) completed the study. Subjects were included based on: 
(1) no past or current psychiatric disorders according to SCID-I/P (First et al., 1995), (2) no 
medical condition that interfered with the objectives of the study as established by a 
physician, and (3) no use of illicit drugs or psychoactive medications according to history 
and confirmed by a negative urine screen. All subjects gave written informed consent 
approved by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Human Investigation Review 
Board and were compensated for their participation.
Procedure
We used a similar procedure as in our prior study (Robinson et al., 2013a), except that 
thought probes were added to the task. Briefly, subjects performed SART during alternating 
safe conditions, when they were safe from shock, and threat conditions, when they were at 
risk of receiving unpredictable (and performance-independent) unpleasant shocks. Subjects’ 
anxiety level was assessed with subjective reports and the acoustic startle reflex (i.e., the 
ocular motor response to a loud burst of noise). This reflex was utilized because it is 
robustly increased by aversive states and constitutes a reliable measure of anxiety (Grillon, 
2008). One of the advantages of the startle methodology is that, because it is a response to 
an external stimulus under control of the experimenter, it can be used to probe ongoing 
changes in anxiety state.
Following attachment of the electrodes, nine startle stimuli were delivered every 18–25 s 
during the habituation phase. This was followed by a shock work-up procedure that sets the 
shock intensity at a level that was uncomfortable but not painful (a 4 on a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 1 is barely perceptible and 5 is painful) by gradually increasing the intensity of the 
shock. Next, subjects performed a variant of SART (Robertson et al., 1997) in alternating 
safe and shock threat conditions.
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART)
The stimuli were presented on a monitor. Participants were asked to respond to frequent 
“go” stimuli (“=”) and to withhold their response to occasional “nogo” stimuli (“O”). These 
stimuli were randomly distributed and were presented for 250 ms at a rate of one every 2000 
ms. There were two runs with a 5-min rest between runs. Each run consisted of a total of six 
continuous 110-s SART blocks: three safe blocks alternating with three threat blocks. In 
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each block, the go stimuli were presented on 50 occasions while the no-go stimulus occurred 
five times per block for a total of 150 go and 15 no-go trials (adding up to 10% of total 
trials) per safe or threat condition. The first SART block was counterbalanced between runs 
and across subjects such that half of the subjects started with a safe and a threat condition in 
the first and second runs, respectively, and the other half with the reverse order. Subjects 
were asked to focus equally on speed and accuracy.
Startle stimuli, shocks, and threat condition
In each run, SART started with three startle stimuli (before the first go/nogo block). 
Subsequently, three startle stimuli were delivered in each block to assess subjects’ anxiety. 
Startle stimuli always occurred between two go trials. A single shock was delivered at the 
end of one of the threat block in each run just prior to a go trial that was not included in the 
analysis (for a total of two shocks during the experiment). Subjects were informed that 
shock could be administered only in the threat condition and never in the safe condition. 
They were told that the computer decided the number of shocks and time of shock delivery, 
and that the probability of shocks did not dependent on their performance. The onset of the 
safe and threat conditions were signaled by a text on the monitor that indicated “you are safe 
from shock” and “you are at-risk of shock”, respectively. After each run, subjects rated 
retrospectively their anxiety in the safe and threat condition on an analog scale ranging from 
0 (not at all anxious) to 10 (extremely anxious).
Thought probes
Immediately after each startle stimulus in the go/nogo blocks, questions on the monitor 
prompted subjects to report their thoughts on a response key pad with choices of: task-
related thoughts (TRT), threat-related (anxious) task-unrelated thoughts (threatTUTs), or 
threat-unrelated (non-anxious) task-unrelated thoughts (nonthreatTUTs). Thus, subjects 
were asked to report their thoughts 18 times in the safe conditions (3 thought probes x 3 
blocks x 2 runs) and 18 times in the threat condition. Subjects were given the following 
instructions:
“Occasionally during the task you will be asked to rate whether your thought was 
task-related, task-unrelated but threat-related, or task-unrelated and threat-
unrelated. If you were thinking about the task, then we’ll say you were having a 
task-related thought. If you were thinking about the threat, then we’ll say you were 
having a threat-related thought. If you were not thinking about the task and not 
thinking about the threat, then you were having a task-unrelated and threat-
unrelated thought. The question you need to answer after each loud noise is, “Was I 
thinking about doing the task,” “Was I thinking about the threat,” or “Was I 
thinking about something other than the task or the threat?” Let’s define what I 
mean by “task-related thoughts,” “threat-related thoughts,” and “task-unrelated and 
threat-unrelated thoughts.”
A task-related thought is thinking about performing the task, paying attention to the 
stimuli and your responses.
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A threat-related thought is any thought that is focused solely on the threat 
experiment. For example, you may be thinking about how uncomfortable is the 
shock, when it will be administered, how you feel, or when the current condition 
will stop.
A task-unrelated and threat-unrelated thought is not thinking about the task or the 
threat of shock. For example, you may think of something you did this morning or 
last night, a friend, teacher, or family member, or what you will do later during the 
day. Your mind may wander and you may have thoughts and images about things 
that have nothing to do with the threat, such as whether you are hungry or tired, 
etc.”
Questionnaires
During the screening procedure, which occurred 1–3 weeks prior to testing, subjects were 
asked to fill out: Spielberger trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger, 1983) and the Attentional 
Control Scale (Derryberry and Reed, 2002). The ACS is a 20-item self-report scale that 
measures attentional focusing (9 items) and attentional shifting (11 items) (Derryberry and 
Rothbart, 1997). Higher scores on ACS reflect better ability to direct and maintain attention.
Stimulation and Physiological Responses
Stimulation and recording were controlled by a commercial system (Contact Precision 
Instruments, UK). The acoustic startle stimulus was a 40 ms duration 103-dB (A) burst of 
white noise presented via headphones. The eye blink reflex was recorded with two 
electrodes placed under the left eye and a ground electrode placed on the left arm. The 
electromyographic (EMG) eyeblink signal was amplified with bandwidth set to 30–500 Hz 
and digitized at a rate of 1000 Hz. The shock was administered either on the left wrist or on 
the left middle and ring fingers, depending on where the subject reached the desired 
intensity.
Data Analysis
For the go trials, correct responses consisted of any go trial in which there was a response, 
and for the nogo trials, correct trials were those in which no response was provided. 
Performance was determined for each condition (threat, safe) and trial type (go, nogo) by 
dividing the number of correct trials by the total number of each trial type. The one trial 
following a shock was excluded from analyses. Three measures of RT were also computed 
because they inform on the nature of information processing during SART. These included 
mean correct-go RT, to assess speed/accuracy trade-off (Peebles and Bothell, 2004), go RT 
variability, a measure of endogenous attention (Hu et al., 2012, McVay and Kane, 2009), 
and pre-nogo RT. This latter measure provides an assessment of the development of habitual 
responses and attentional lapses because nogo errors of commission are usually preceded by 
faster RT (Robertson et al., 1997). Response variability was determined by calculating the 
standard deviation of the mean RT for go trials for each subject. Pre-error RTs were 
averaged across the four go trials before nogo trials, averaged separately for each condition, 
and stratified into correct and error of commission nogo trials (Robertson et al., 1997).
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After full-wave rectification and smoothing the EMG signal, peak startle/eye blink 
magnitude was determined in the 20–100-ms timeframe following stimulus onset relative to 
a 50-ms pre-stimulus baseline. The startle responses from each participant were transformed 
to z scores and converted to T scores and then averaged separately within the safe and the 
threat conditions. The subjective anxiety scores were also averaged within each condition.
Because the thoughts (TRTs, threatTUTs, nonthreatTUTs) scores were not normally 
distributed, they were normalized with a square root transformation. They were analyzed in 
two steps. First, we examined whether the rate of TRTs changed between conditions. 
Second, we assessed the change in the rates of TUTs (threatTUTs vs. nonthreatTUTs) 
between conditions. Data were analyzed with mixed-model repeated measures analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) and t-tests. Multiple regression analyses were used to identify unique 
predictors of nogo accuracy. Partial correlations (rs) are also reported.
Results
Demographic
Subjects’ mean (sem) trait anxiety and ACS scores were 28.0 (.8) and 59.9 (.9), respectively. 
Trait anxiety and ACS scores were negatively correlated (r=−.33, p<.01).
Anxiety measures
As expected, startle magnitude was larger in the threat (mean = 52.0, sem = .28) compared 
to the safe (mean = 46.4, sem = .28) condition (t(59)=8.7, p<0001), and retrospective ratings 
of anxiety were also higher in the threat (mean = 2.6, sem = .2) compared to the safe (mean 
= 5.2, sem = .3) condition (t(59)=12.1, p<0001).
Performance
Nogo trial accuracy and go trial accuracy, mean RT, and RT variability were analyzed using 
paired t-tests between safe and threat conditions (Table 1). Replicating our previous finding 
(Robinson et al., 2013a), accuracy to nogo trials (t(59)=3.6, p=0006) improved from the safe 
to the threat condition. This was paralleled by a decreased in RT variability to go trials from 
the threat to the safe condition (t(59)=2.5, p=01). There was also a trend for better accuracy 
to go trials (t(59)=1.7, p=08) in the threat compared to the safe condition with no significant 
change in RT to go trials between conditions (t(59)=1.3, ns).
Comparison of RT that preceded correct and incorrect nogo trials (Table 1) was conducted 
with a condition (safe, threat) x nogo trial type (correct rejection, error of commission) 
ANOVA. Two subjects had no nogo trials error and were not included in the analysis. The 
nogo trial type main effect was significant due to faster RT preceding errors compared to 
correct trials (F(1,57)=17.1, p=.0001). The condition effect was also significant due to faster 
response in the threat compared to the safe condition (F(1,57)=7.3, p=.009). There was no 
significant interaction effect.
Grillon et al. Page 7
Cogn Emot. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 June 01.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Thought probes
Fig. 1 shows the frequency of each type of thought. The TRT and TUT (threatTUTs + 
nonthreatTUTs) scores were analyzed separately because of colinearity (TRTs + threatTUTs 
+ nonthreatTUTs =1). Two main results emerged. First, the rates of TRTs did not 
significantly differ between the safe and threat conditions (t(59)=1.0, p=.32). Second, within 
the off-task thought categories (TUT), there was a differential effect of the safe/threat 
condition on thought types (condition x thought types: F(1,59)=49.6, p<.00009). There were 
more nonthreatTUTs than threatTUTs in the safe condition (t(59)=2.6, p=.009), and more 
threatTUTs than nonthreatTUTs in the threat condition (t(59)=5.1, p<.00009). Taken 
together, these results indicate that the rate of anxious thoughts (threatTUTs) increased in 
the threat compared to the safe condition, but this increase was at the expense of non-
anxious mind wandering (nonthreatTUTs), not at the expense of TRTs.
To examine the validity of the thought probe methodology, we examined the association 
between thought types and our behavioral and physiological measures of performance and 
anxiety. We examined whether 1) TRTs correlated with an objective measure of endogenous 
attention, go RT variability (Hu et al., 2012, McVay and Kane, 2009), and 2) threatTUTs 
correlated with measures of state anxiety (subjective anxiety and potentiated startle). The 
TRTs correlated negatively with RT variability only in the safe condition (r=−.25, p<.05), 
such that the more on-task the subjects reported to be, the less variable their RT was (or, 
conversely, the less on-task, the more RT variability). The threatTUTs correlated positively 
with subjective anxiety in the threat condition (r=.31, p<.03). In addition, the change in the 
rate of threatTUTs from safe to threat correlated positively with the difference startle 
magnitudes (i.e., fear-potentiated startle; r=.30, p=.03) and with the difference retrospective 
anxiety scores (r= .27, p=.04).
Correlation and regression
To investigate potential individual predictors of performance, correlations between nogo 
accuracy and ACS, trait anxiety, TRTs, go RT, and go RT-variability were first calculated 
separately for the safe and threat conditions to determine variables to be used in the multiple 
regression analysis. Nogo accuracy in the safe condition was positively correlated with ACS 
(r=.39, p<.01) and negatively correlated with go RT-variability (r=−.39, p<.01). Nogo 
accuracy in the threat condition was positively correlated with go mean RT (r=.32, p<.01) 
and negatively correlated with go RT-variability (r=.36, p<.01).
To test which of the variables that significantly correlated with nogo accuracy explained 
independent variance, separate stepwise multiple regression analyses were used with the 
nogo accuracy as the dependent variable for the safe and threat condition data. For the safe 
condition, the final model comprised three independent predictors, which together explained 
44% of the variance; nogo accuracy was correlated positively with ACS (beta = .31, F = 9.1, 
p<.01; partial correlation rs = .33, p<.01) and go mean RT (beta = .42, F =15.0, p<.001; rs = 
2.4, p=.06), and negatively with RT variability (beta = −.56, F =25.9, p<.0001; rs =−.42, p<.
001). For the threat condition, the final model included two independent predictors, which 
together explained 41% of the variance; nogo accuracy was correlated positively with the 
mean go RT (beta = .62, F =29.7, p<.0001; rs=−.41, p<.001) and negatively with RT 
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variability (beta = −.63, F =30.1, p<.0001; rs=.33, p<.01). Thus, ACS did not contribute to 
the model in the threat condition.
The reason why ACS contributed to the model in safe but not threat was probably because 
only the low ACS subjects improved their performance from safe to threat (i.e., low ACS is 
associated with lower performance in safe but not in threat). To examine this possibility, an 
additional analysis examined potential predictors of the accuracy improvement from safe to 
threat. We conducted a stepwise regression analysis using the difference scores [threat 
minus safe] for nogo accuracy as the dependent variables. The potential predictors were 
ACS and the difference scores [threat minus safe] for the variables that correlated with 
performance in the safe or threat condition, i.e., threatTUTs, go RT mean, and go RT-
variability. The final model explained 12% of the variance with only one variable, ACS, 
correlating negatively with the difference nogo accuracy score (beta = −.27, F =4.8, p<.03). 
Thus, the lower ACS was, the more go accuracy improved from safe to threat condition. For 
illustration purpose, we calculated nogo accuracy in the safe and threat conditions in low 
and high ACS groups based on a median split of ACS scores (Fig. 2). Accuracy in the high 
ACS group increased slightly and non-significantly from the safe to the threat condition 
(t(28)=.7, ns). In contrast, in the low ACS group, nogo accuracy improved significantly from 
the safe to the threat condition (t(30)=4.2, p=.0002).
Because a prior study reported slower RT in high trait anxious subjects, in a post-hoc 
analysis, we examined the association between trait anxiety and performance. Consistent 
with (Righi et al., 2009), we found no significant correlation between trait anxiety and 
accuracy in the safe or threat conditions (all p>.2).
Discussion
In a prior study, we reported improved nogo accuracy during shock threat (Robinson et al., 
2013a). The present study replicates this finding, and, importantly, provides clues as to the 
variables that may have contributed to this performance improvement. Specifically, we 
identified individual differences in attention control as an important factor influencing 
performance distinctly during threat and safety. Other potential mechanisms will be 
discussed.
Individual differences in attention control emerged as a powerful modulator of performance 
on sustained attention during threat. Specifically, during the safe condition, low attention 
control, as assessed with ACS, was associated with lower performance (increased nogo 
errors of commission) compared to high attention control. This result is consistent with the 
role of attention control in sustained attention tests such as SART (Herrmann et al., 2003, 
Wiersema and Roeyers, 2009). However, during shock threat, performance improvement 
was associated with low attention control, such that the threat condition permitted 
individuals with low attention control to perform at the level of individuals with high 
attentional control. Finally, in contrast to individuals with low attention control, those with 
high attention control performed similarly in the safe and threat conditions. It is unlikely that 
failure to improve during shock threat in this latter group was due to ceiling performance 
since responses were correctly inhibited on only 74% of the nogo trials. These findings are 
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reminiscent of results of a shock threat study, in which low heart rate variability, indicating 
poor attention control (Healy, 2010, Nigg, 2006, Stifter and Jain, 1996, Thayer and Lane, 
2000), was associated with improved cognitive performance during a threat relative to safe 
context (Hansen et al., 2009). Thus, in Hansen et al’ study and in our study, shock threat 
promoted an attentional state that benefited subjects with poor attention control, i.e., subjects 
who were most likely to be in a relative inattentive state. Conceivably, the impaired 
performance associated with low attention control in a safe environment could be due to 
reduced ability to cope with the tedious nature of the vigilance task, leading to poor effortful 
attention.
It is noteworthy that go RT-variability was reduced during threat condition, suggesting 
increased endogenous attention (Hu et al., 2012, Manly et al., 1999), an effect that may be 
related to increased prefrontal cortex activity (Forster et al., 2013). Indeed, RT variability 
during cognitive tasks has been associated to prefrontal top-down control of attention 
(Bellgrove et al., 2004, Johnson et al., 2008). The threat condition might have raised arousal 
to an optimum attention control level, or it may have provided the motivation to increase 
attentional effort towards the task as a coping strategy to prevent distraction from threat 
processing and to reduce anxiety (Baumeister, 1991, Van Dillen and Koole, 2007). The 
increased performance (decreased nogo errors of commission) in the threat condition may 
have been an indirect benefit of this coping strategy.
These results, together with previous findings (Forster et al., 2013, Righi et al., 2009), 
suggest differential effects of trait anxiety and state anxiety on SART performance, with 
trait anxiety potentially impairing attention control, and state anxiety improving attention 
control. That trait anxious individuals perform poorly on SART is consistent with reports 
that such individuals exhibit poor attention control. In the present study, for example, trait 
anxiety correlated negatively with ACS. However, the post-hoc analysis showed that trait 
anxiety was not associated with poor performance. Because we did not attempt to recruit 
high trait anxious subjects, we do not know whether the present results would extend to high 
trait anxious individuals. In addition, it is possible that increased arousal due to shock threat 
compensated for poor attention control associated with high trait anxiety. However, in an 
ongoing study (data in preparation), we show no difference in SART performance between 
psychiatrically healthy controls and individuals with anxiety disorders (who, by definition, 
have high trait anxiety). Thus, in this regard, our results are consistent with Righi et al who 
reported no effect of trait anxiety on SART performance (Righi et al., 2009). Finally, in our 
ongoing study, the anxious patients also show improved accuracy during shock threat. 
Hence, whether trait anxiety is associated with poor performance remain to be demonstrated. 
Of course, this does not mean that the underlying neural mechanisms supporting 
performance are similar in low and high trait individuals (Righi et al., 2009). In fact, trait 
anxiety-related differences may be easier to identify at the neural level than at the level of 
behavior (Righi et al., 2009).
Other potential mechanisms of improved performance (nogo accuracy) in the threat vs. safe 
condition can be proposed. SART performance is influenced by strategic speed-accuracy 
trade-off (Peebles and Bothell, 2004). Eysenck’s Attention Control Theory stipulates that 
anxious individuals increase their efforts to keep performance to a level comparable to low 
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trait anxious individuals (Eysenck et al., 2007). This is reflected in slower RT to maintain 
accuracy (Eysenck et al., 2007). In fact, a recent study reported that high trait anxious 
individuals slowed down their go-RTs during SART, probably to avoid making nogo 
commission errors ((Forster et al., 2013) (but see (Righi et al., 2009)). This RT slowdown 
was associated with reduced prefrontal cortex activation, suggesting poor prefrontal control 
(Forster et al., 2013). The present study showed no effect of shock threat on go RT, 
indicating that the improved accuracy was not caused by a speed-accuracy trade-off.
Low attention control could also be associated with poor inhibitory control of prepotent 
responses, and shock threat might have helped to transiently improve inhibitory control. 
This latter hypothesis is consistent with studies showing a link between anxiety and 
enhanced motor inhibition to nogo trials (Righi et al., 2009, Sehlmeyer et al., 2010). It is 
also consistent with theoretical models that propose that anxiety activates the behavioral 
inhibition system (Gray, 1987, Quay, 1997, Wright et al., 2014). At a neural level, both 
SART (Grahn and Manly, 2012, Pardo et al., 1991) and anxious anticipation (Mechias et al., 
2010) activate the premotor cortex (Brodmann area 6), which is part of the Corbetta et al’s 
dorsal attention network and is closely linked to the generation of action (Corbetta et al., 
2008). It is therefore possible that in the present study, response inhibition was facilitated by 
threat-related potentiation of this region’s activity via input from the septo-hippocampal 
system, the region implicated in the behavioral inhibition system (Gray, 1987).
Because it has been argued that mind wandering depends on the extent to which the current 
context primes personally-relevant concerns (Klinger, 1971, McVay and Kane, 2010), one 
would expect that a monotonous task such as SART would be especially vulnerable to 
attentional lapses caused by self-referential mentation or anxious vigilance during shock 
threat. This assumption was not supported in the present study. Despite objective (startle) 
and subjective (retrospective rating) measures of heightened anxiety in the threat condition, 
shock threat did not increase the overall rate of TUTs; it increased anxious cognition 
(threatTUTs) at the expense of non-anxious cognition (nonthreatTUTs), but not at the 
expense of TRTs. One possibility is that there was a tendency for increased TUTs during the 
shock threat but that this tendency was neutralized by increased attention to the task, 
suggesting that subjects were prioritizing the task over the threat. Our previous results with a 
n-back task during shock threat suggests that only cognitively demanding tasks strongly 
inhibits or limits subjective and physiological responses to shock threat (Vytal et al., 2012). 
Hence, one would expect that in a low demanding cognitive task, shock threat would lead to 
increases TUTs.
This study had strengths and limitations. Among the strengths, we manipulated anxiety in a 
within-subject design, and relied on well-established methods of fear induction and 
measurement (Grillon and Baas, 2003), and thought assessment (Gruberger et al., 2011, 
Teasdale et al., 1995). Regarding the latter method, the correlations between TRTs and RT 
variability, as well as threatTUTs and subjective anxiety and fear-potentiated startle provide 
some validity to our approach. Among the limitations, the probe methodology has its 
drawbacks. Probing for thoughts might interfere with the same process we attempted to 
study and might change the nature of the SART task by making it less tedious or by 
interfering with the task itself (Giambra, 1995). Yet, alternative to the probe thought 
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methodology, such as retrospective questionnaires, have their distinct weaknesses (Ericsson 
and Simon, 1980). The introduction of thought probes did not seem to have disrupted our 
threat experiment since we replicated our previous finding (Robinson et al., 2013a). To 
minimize interference from the probe thought methodology, we restricted the questions to a 
minimum. As a result, we did not assess thoughts that could have helped to interpret the data 
further. For example, we did not assess worries unrelated to the shock threat, that is, worries 
about performance (e.g., I am doing poorly) or unrelated to the experiment (e.g., I am going 
to the dentist tonight). However, two findings suggest that we successfully assessed anxious 
thoughts related to the shock threat: first, the threatTUTs were more frequent in the threat 
than the safe condition, and second the threatTUTs were correlated with subjective and 
objective (fear-potentiated startle) measures of anxiety. It is possible that worries about the 
experiment were included in TRTs (and worries unrelated to the experiment were classified 
as threatTUTs). This might have weakened our ability to find correlations between TRTs 
and performance.
To summarize, we replicated our previous finding that shock threat improve performance on 
SART. We showed that this effect applied essentially to subjects with low attention control. 
These subjects’ performance was impaired during nogo trials in the safe condition 
(compared to the high attention control subjects), but nogo performance was restored in the 
threat condition, perhaps as a result of non-specific increased in cortical arousal and/or 
improved inhibitory control of prepotent responses. We also found that, while the levels of 
threat-related TUTs increased in the threat condition, they did so at the expense of non 
threat-related TUTs, not TRTs. This may partly explain the reason why worrisome thoughts 
did not interfere with performance.
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Fig. 1. 
Proportion of each thought type in the safe and threat conditions. TRTs = task-related 
thoughts; nonthreatTUTs = threat-unrelated and task-unrelated thoughts; threatTUTs = 
threat-related and task-unrelated thoughts. Error bars are standard error of the mean. *** for 
p<.0009.
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Fig. 2. 
Accuracy rates on nogo trials during the safe and threat conditions in the low and high ACS 
groups. Error bars are standard error of the mean. *** for p<.0009.
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Table 1
Performance to go and nogo trials in the safe and threat condition
Safe Threat
Nogo accuracy .70 (.02)
.75 (.02)**
Go accuracy .89 (.01) .90 (0.1)
Go RT 342.3 (6.1) ms 339.2 (6.1) ms
Go variability 133.0 (8.0) ms 120.1 (8.0) ms*
RT to 4 go trials before nogo trials
 - Correct omission 341.5 (8.0) ms 338.2 (7.3) ms
 - Commission errors 324.1 (10.6) ms^ 298.5 (7.7) ms^
*for p=.015;
**for p=.0006;
^for main effect of false alarm vs. correct omission: p=.0001
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